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JURISDICTION

May a FederalCourt Remand a Case to State Court
After FederalClaims Have Been Deleted?
by Joseph P. Bauer

Carnegie-Mellon University
V.

Honorable Maurice B. Cohill,Jr.
(Docket No. 86-1021)
Argued November 10, 1987
This case concerns the circumstances under which a
lawsuit, properly commenced in a state court and then
removed before trial to a federal court, may he sent back
(remanded) to the state court.
On one level, this case seems only to involve technical
interpretations of federal statutes governing procedure
in the federal courts. At another level, however, it involves more general and important issues. Among these
are how to allocate judicial power and responsibility
between the state and federal courts; the authority of
federal judges to expand limitations on federal statutes,
through exercising judicial discretion and the rights of
individuals to control the foruin for litigating their disputes by changing their original complaint.

arising under Pennsylvania state law, including tort,
breach of contract, infliction of" elotional distress, defitmation and misrepresentation. In addition, Boyle asserted that his discharge was based oil the Ifact that lie
was fifty-six years old, and that this age discrimination
was unlawftl under the laws both of Pennsylvania and
of the United States.
Based on a federal statute which permits certain
cases brought in state courts to be removed to federal
court (28 U.S.C. section 144 1), Carnegie and Kordesich
removed the case to the United States District Court for
the Western )istrict of' Pennsylvania. The Boyles made
no objection to the removal, nor did they seek to have
the case remanded to tile state court.
After a variety of steps leading ip to trial, which took
about eight months, the Boyles amended their coinplaint to delete the cause of action arising under the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Since the Boyles' complaint then asserted claims arising solely under state law, they simultaneously made a
motion to reniandl the case to state court. Carnegie-Nielton objected, asserting that the federal court had atl-

thority either to retain the case or to dismiss it, but not lo
ISSUES
When an action is originally filed in a state court
which asserts claims arising under both state and f[ederal
laws, and then removed to federal court, may the federal court send the action back to the state court if the
federal claims are deleted from tile complaint? Or, in
such a situation, is the federal court limited to either
retaining the action or dismissing it for lack of'jurisdiction?

FACTS
William Boyle, an employee of Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was discharged from
employment because lie refused to accept blame for
some improper billings and certain thefts at the University. He and his wife, Carrie Boyle, brought a lawsuit
against Carnegie and against John Kordesich, his supervisor at Carnegie, in a Pennsylvania state court. The
complaint alleged that he was wrongfully discharged
and entitled to recovery under a variety of' theories
Joseph P. Bater is a Professor f Law and Associate Dean at
Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dante, IN 46556; telephone
(219) 239-6514.
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remand it to state court. The court decided to remand
the case.

Carnegie and Kordesich then appealed this decision
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. Asserting that the federal trial court judgeJudge Maurice Cohill-had abused his discretion in renmanding the action, they sought a writ of mandamus frol
the appellate court, to require judge Cohill to rescind
his remand order.
The action was first heard by a three judge panel. By
a 2-to-I decision, the Third Circuit determined that
.Judge Cohill had abused his discretion in remanding the
action, and issued the writ of mandamus ordering him to
vacate his order. The court of appeals voted to hear the
case en banc and to vacate the decision of the three judge
panel. After the rehearing, the Third Circuit split 5-to5. This had tile effect of upholding the district court's
order. Carnegie-Mellon then sought review in the
United States Supreme Court.

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The judicial power of the federal courts is limited.
For these courts to havejurisdiction to hear a case, the
PREVIEW

action must in the first instance fall within Article III of
the Constitution, and then within a federal statute.
Broadly speaking, there are two major categories of
situations in which the federal courts can hear a case:
where the plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of different states (diversity jurisdiction), or where the plaintiff asserts a claim which arises under federal law
(federal questionjurisdiction).
Here, the parties apparently were all citizens of Pennsylvania, and therefore diversity jurisdiction did not
exist. If the plaintiffs had asserted claims arising solely
under Pennsylvania law, there also would have been no
federal question jurisdiction, and therefore this case
could have been heard only in a state court. On the
other hand, once the plaintiffs asserted a claim under a
federal statute (the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act), a federal question was presented, and federal court
jurisdiction existed over that claim.
In a case decided in 1966-United Mine Workers v.

Gibbs (383 U.S. 715)-the Supreme Court held that if a
plaintiff asserts both state law and federal claims in the
same lawsuit, and if those claims arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence, the entire case can be
brought in federal court, and it can exercise "pendent
jurisdiction" over the entire action. This decision was an
interpretation both of the judicial power conferred by
Article III and the statutory specification of federal
jurisdiction found in 28 U.S.C. section 1332. Applying
the Gibbs test to this case, since all of the Boyles' claims
arose out of the alleged wrongful discharge, they could
have commenced the entire action in a federal court.
The right of a defendant to remove an action from
state to federal court is entirely statutory, there being no
express provision for removal in the Constitution. In 28
U.S.C. section 1441, a defendant is given the right to
remove an action to federal court if the action was one
over which the federal courts would have had original
jurisdiction. Since, as noted, the Boyles could have
brought their combined state and federal claims in federal court had they wanted to do so originally, the defendants probably had the absolute right-without
seeking permission either of the plaintiffs or from the
court-to remove the action. By filing the removal petition with the federal court, removal was automatic, and
an objection by the Boyles-had it been made-probably
would have been futile. (While neither of the parties
challenged tile propriety of removal, and both lower
courts assumed removal was proper, one of the amici'
argues that removal was unauthorized by the relevant
federal statutes. If the Supreme Court agrees with this
position, it could decide the case on this ground and
would then never reach the issues presented by the
parties.)
The particular issue arises once the Boyles obtained
leave of the federal court to delete their federal claim,
leaving an action arising solely under state law. As
Issue No. 4

noted, that action could not have been brought originally in federal court, and hence would have been unremovable. In this now altered state of affairs, what should
the federal court have done with the action?
Similar problems have been presented in a number
of prior lower court cases. About a half dozen of the
federal intermediate appellate courts-the courts of appeals-have wrestled with this question, and have
reached differing conclusions. In part, it was this split in
the circuits which motivated the Supreme Court to take
this case and to resolve this question.
One obvious possibility was that the district court
could have dismissed the action, allowing the plaintiffs
to recommence it in state court. One objection that the
plaintiffs might have to this alternative, however, is that
in the meantime the statute of limitations on the action
might have run, foreclosing any action in any court.
Although there is some doubt as to the facts, the plaintiffs here probably would have faced such a bar in state
court.
A second possibility is that the federal court could
nonetheless have retained the now purely state law action. The Gibbs case offers some authority for such a
procedure. If a mixed federal-state law action is commenced in a federal court, and the federal claim fails,
Gibbs held that the court still may, under certain circumstances, retain the nonfederal claims. However, perhaps
because of the factual differences of this case, as well as
the relatively early stage of the litigation here (before
trial had started), the federal court did not follow that
option.
Just as the procedure for removal is purely statutory,
so is the procedure for remand. The relevant statute (28
U.S.C. section 1447(b)) provides that if "at any time
before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case." Here, however, the
removal was proper. It was only after the removal occurred and part of the claim was dismissed, thatjurisdiction no longer existed. Furthermore, this situation arose
because of the unilateral action of the plaintiff.
In this case, the federal district court judge stated
that the statute was not the sole source of authority for
remand, and that he could exercise "discretion" to remand in situations such as this. Objecting, the defendants asserted that remand can be done only as the
statute authorizes, and that the Congress, by passing
such a statutory provision, determined not to give
judges any such discretion.
This case, then, turns in part on the construction of a
federal statute (28 U.S.C. section 1447(b)), and the Supreme Court could decide the case on relatively narrow
grounds, basing its decision purely on the proper interpretation of the statute. The Court could, however, take
a broader view of the issues.
As noted, this case involves the allocation of judicial
1An

responsibility between the federal and state courts. Approximately 6 to 7 per cent of all federal cases arrive
each year in the federal courts by removal from state
courts. Whether the parties choose federal or state court
is influenced by such varied factors as docket length,
location of the courthouse, perceived biases of the
judges and juries and differences in rules of procedure
and evidence. Thus, a decision on the circumstances in
which remand is available will affect both this choice and
the caseloads of the two sets of courts.
This case also raises issues of federalism and comity
between state and federal courts. Since the action now
involves only state law issues, it would appear that a state
court is the best forum for resolving the dispute. Retention of the action in federal court would interfere with
state interests. This concern led eighteen states to file an
amicus brief, supporting the Boyles' position and arguing for the propriety of remand.
A third broader issue arises from the exercise of
discretion by the federal courts. It is unclear to what
extent a federaljudge can read a statute expansively, or
add a provision not found in its precise language, when
the court deems this necessary to achieve justice or to
adjust for unexpressed congressional intent. Although
the issue arises here in the context of a procedural
provision for managing federal litigation, the Court's
decision could have implications elsewhere.
Finally, the case does involve competition by the
parties for control of the forum for their litigation. In
the first instance, if the plaintiffs had omitted any federal claim from the original action, it would clearly have
been unremovable, and the defendants would have been
relegated to state court. On the other hand, by adding
the federal claim, the plaintiffs afforded the defendants
the right of removal over which the plaintiffs had no
control. Once removal takes place, to what extent should
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the plantiffs have the right to deprive the defendants of
a federal forum by deleting claims selectively? Since
federal courts have frequently been jealous about protecting their jurisdiction, there may be concerns about
possible manipulation by post-removal changes in the
complaint.
ARGUMENTS
For Carnegie-MellonUniversity (Counsel of Record, Walter P.
DeForest, 111, Mellon Square, 435 Sixth Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA
15219; telephone (412) 288-3383)
1. Prior Supreme Court caselaw indicates that federal
statutes provide the exclusive grounds upon which a
district court may remand a properly removed action.
2. Policy reasons support the conclusion that a district
court may remand an action only pursuant to these
statutes; on the other hand, there is no basis for
expanding the grounds for remand by exercising
judicial discretion.
ForJudge Cohill and the Boyles (Counsel of Record, AllanJ.
Opsitnick, 527 Court Place, Pittsburgh, PA 15219; telephone
(412) 391-3299)
1. In Gibbs, the Supreme Court gave federal courts
broad discretion to exercise pendentjurisdiction.
2. Under Gibbs, once a federal claim is dismissed and
only state claims remain, federal courts have discretion to retain the entire action, to dismiss the lawsuit,
or to remand to state court.

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support ofJudge Cohill and the Boyles
The state of California with seventeen other states,
jointly; Department of Water and Power, City of Los
Angeles
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